The stabilization in 92-93 in India was followed by major structural reforms, an important part of which was opening company infrastructure sectors to private and to foreign capital.
The report of the expert committee set up for the purpose, popularly called the Rakesh Mohan Committee (RMC) report, set the agenda for the reform of the infrastructure sector. The electricity sector has witnessed the so called independent power reducer policy that encourage the private sector to generate power to be sold to state electricity boards(SEBs) through long term contracts as early as in 1994. The RMC report served to highlight the importanc3e of bringing in the private sector to most areas of infrastructure. Following the report many states passed legislations that created umbrella organizations, typically Infrastructural Development Boards (IDBs), that have the mandate develop infrastructure especially through price capital. Through enactments, participation by the private sector, typically on a BOT basis was enabled in most states.
The much hoped for investments in urban areas have yet to materialize.
The creation of IDBs did not give these organizations sufficient power, and the new laws did not address the issues emanating from consistency with pass laws and authorities.
Thus turf wars between the IDB and the PWD, irrigation departments and roads and bridges department were not uncommon.
PROBLEMS
Ø Problems of land acquisition
The perception is that India’s democracy naturally makes land acquisition difficult while in China and elsewhere in East Asia the matter is easy since governments are not accountable. Land values in areas surrounding urban centers incorporate the sides the rents in agricultural use, the value arising out of the probability that they would be huge for non agricultural purposes such as housing. But in India since government have discretionary control over land use, the latter value does not uniformly accrue to all lands surrounding in urban area. This would depress the prices elsewhere while raising it for the land released from agricultural use and acquired. Thus post acquisition market prices are always very high, often by as much as 5-10 times the pre- acquisition ‘market’ prices paid.
Ø Institutional framework for acquisition is problematic.
There is far too much discretion and power available to the administrator and the government. This creates a conflict of interest that acts against landowners who do not have contacts in high places.
Ø Infrastructural failure
Among the visible evidence of the country’s infrastructure failure is its cities. In planning with very low space indices that have little relationship with location economics, the land cost share in infrastructure becomes too high. Since much urban infrastructure shows increasing return to density it too becomes expensive.
Ø Overambitious standards in infrastructure
Overambitious standards in infrastructure, especially in the layout of townships have also been a cause of failure. Thus the excessive provision of open and public spaces in the dsign invites violations since they are often ‘unaffordable’. Such violations then spread given the very high returns, so that the good chance of holding on to reasonable standards is lost.
Ø Coordination problem
The coordination among multiple agencies and authorities necessary for the seamless construction and management of a road, or in the realization of the benefits from the multimodal design has proved to be all but impossible to realize. The problem is fundamental and lies in the nature of the accountability of the key managers within the states. Politicians cannot credibly promise to get a local road or water supplies fixed.
Ø Retarded regulatory developments
Regulatory developments in infrastructure with notable exception of the TRAI in telecom have proved to be an added retardant to not only private investment but investments in general.
Ø Procurement failure
Procurement failure is another important reason for poor infrastructural performance. Service contracts that attempt to shift all risks on the private party, payment terms that do not recognize the experience nature of many foods and services, and frequent post-bid changes in scope, besides poor specifications are typical.
DEVELOPEMENTS
Ø From DFI to IDFC
The idea of a development finance institution (DFI) to merely direct government funds to infrastructure was an anathema in a liberalized financial environment. But the IDFC (Infrastructure Development Finance Company) which was setup in 1997, wisely interpreted its role to be market development, project structuring, viability gap financing, and leveraging private investments through crucial investments.
Ø Guarantees by the government
Similarly guarantees are given to merely cover avoidable risks emanating from poor policies and inadequate contractual framework. Therefore in seeking private investments, very large costs and risk, may ultimately be borne by the state. The worst example of this tendency is the framework that created the IPPs (Independent power Projects) under which cash strung state electricity boards (SEB) were encouraged to sign high cost power purchase agreements (PPAs) that shifted more significant business risks on to the government, while taking over political risks. And, to compensate for this reversal the private parties charged high-risk premium returns.
Ø Marginal success in development indicators
The failure of the state in infrastructure and more generally in the provision of public services is systematically reveled. Development indicators that depend upon the state and its activities and where the public aspect is large do relatively poor than do others that depend less on the state. Thus on infant mortality and infant childbirth, both of which depend more on the performance of public health and hygiene organizations, India’s score is far below of that other countries with similar levels of income. But, on adult mortality which can be mitigated by a private health sector- India’s low cost doctors and medicines- The performance is significantly above that of its peers.
Ø Demand side measures initiated by the government
Energy Conservation Building Code (ECBC) has been launched to reduce energy consumption in new commercial buildings.
The government has approved a scheme for capacity building at State level and Standards labeling programme to promote Energy Efficient Equipments and Appliances with allocation of 47.7 crores.
To promote Energy conservation, the Government initiated ‘Energy Conservation Awards’ in 1991.
Painting competitions at school levels are belong organized my the MOP to inculcate the message of Energy Conservation in children of classes IV to V since 2005.
Ø Reforms in many sectors
Roadways
Success has eluded reforms efforts in many sectors. But when realized, the effects have been revolutionary. Thus, the National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) got the essentials of the road construction contracts. Similarly the BOT and annuity frameworks were also essential incentives compatible though fewer stretches were to be build using these reforms. The resulting investments were overwhelming and in a year or so more investments than in an entire decade flowed into the highway sector. The approach and contract forms of the NHAI are also sought to be initiated by many state governments.
Airways
Airlines were thrown open to the private sector without much regulation except on the safety and technical aspects. Despite some major responsibilities limitations such as not allowing private airlines (until recently) to operate on international routes, the airline industry had completely changed from the vantage point of the consumer. New segments have been added and air travel is no longer a luxury, and threatens to challenge immovable railways in upper-class travel. Some improvements in roads, especially in the western and southern part of the country, have suddenly made possible multi-axle trucks with their superior efficiency.
Postal
Much the same is the story in overnight postal package delivery. A private sector, despite the higher cost of duplication of services on account of numerous players, has made it nearly impossible for the high-prices state owned carrier Speed Post to survive. In both airlines and posts, besides the superior operating efficiency of the private sector, the fact of significantly lower level cost for the private sector is important.
Telecom
In telecom, on the other hand, the basics of the regulations (price cap tariffs, independence, shifts from license fees to revenue sharing to lower risks, allowing multiple licenses to ensure competitive behavior even if such entities were under scale, but with no bar on merger and alliances) were right and the technology driver in reducing cost and increasing the overage potential was high. For these two reasons, telecom has grown very rapidly through both private and public investments. Telecom promises to cover all except the bottom 20 percent or so far of the population over the decade. For cellular telecom, India has the lowest tariff in the world. Internet access has also grown by leaps and bounds and a much lower penetration of both telecom and internet as compared to China is on account of factors that lie quite outside the sector (the income level in India being barely a fourth or less that of China, much better income distribution in China, besides higher levels of literacy and education). Problems of quality especially in mobile services have surfaced but are being systematically addressed by the regulator.
FAILURE IN ELECTRICITY REFORMS
Despite more than 10 years of ‘reform’ the electricity sector continues to be plagued by policy and regulatory uncertainty. The system having moved from the earlier Administered Price Mechanism to ad hocism in prices and tax rates. Private investments continue to be negligible and overall rates of investments or capacity additions in these sectors have come down.
The fundamental problems in these sectors emanates from the mode of subsidization. Low prices for electricity (zero prices for use given horsepower-based tariffs) that apply for agriculture major result in distortions on the user and utility sides. The user side distortions on the user and utility sides. The user side distortions include excessive use and wastage , environmental problems including salinity ingress, destruction of aquifers, water intensive crops being grown in dry areas, and cropping matter distortions more generally. India draws out more ground water than any other country by a wide margin. Similarly, the zero tariffs repel any investments in water-saving technologies such as drip and sprinkler systems with much potential since the costs here are private.
In response, the government and regulatory bodies instead of eliminating the price arbitrage try to work around it by having ‘tamper proof’ meters, ‘armored cables’, separation of rural agricultural feeders from others, all of which are not only enormously expensive but also doomed to fail since fundamentally there cannot be an accountability to revenue in a situation of ‘price arbitrage. What is even more remarkable is that there are central programmes that give funds and grants for such investments which are essentially wasteful. In many states electricity distribution officials have been given magisterial powers to resist theft under these conditions. So a simple task like management becomes quasi police and something that has to be mentioned at the highest level-by the prime ministers office.
In electricity the Electricity Act 2003 attempts to bring in open access and competition for the market in generation with trading as a distinct business, and reduction in cross-subsidies. Yet improvements have not taken place.
CHALLENGES AND OUTLOOK
The development of adequate infrastructure is a critical prerequisite for sustaining the growth momentum and to ensure the inclusiveness of the growth process. The Eleventh FYP states that the pattern of inclusive growth with targeted growth rate of GDP at 9 percent can be achieved only if the infrastructure debt can overcome and adequate investment takes place to support higher growth and an improved quality of life for both urban and rural communities.
Each segment in the physical infrastructure sector has its own specificities, be it of land acquisition, environment, regulation, financing or of designing of contracts. The need to develop appropriate mechanisms for financing infrastructure, especially the development of a domestic debt market is overreaching.
It’s also important to ensure synergy in the efforts being made to develop different type infrastructure through effective coordination between different agencies. Then only the sum total can be grater than its parts.
As with any sector, growth of the infrastructure has two dimensions: Growth in output and increment in its capacity. With year-on-year growth of infrastructural output is important in its own rights; it’s evident that addition to capacity is critical determinant of the output.